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SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE AND FOR
IMPEACHMENT OF ONE'S OWN
WITNESS
Rowe v. Farmers Insurance Company'
Should a party be allowed to impeach his own witness without limitation
when that witness contradicts his earlier out-of-court statements? If prior
inconsistent statements are admissible to impeach a witness, then should the
trier of fact be allowed to consider these extrajudicial statements as sub-
stantive evidence? Until recently, Missouri followed the rule that one could
not impeach his own witness absent a showing of surprise and harm. 2 In
addition, the orthodox view limited use of a prior inconsistent statement to
impeachment, thus affecting only the credibility of the witness.' The state-
ment was not admissible as substantive evidence because it was deemed hear-
say. Many times, however, the out-of-court statement was considered as the
truth by jurors who were faced with confusing jury instructions. 4 Indeed,
1. Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
2. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Armbruster,
641 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1982); State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); State v.
Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954); State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1954);
Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 242 S.W.2d 516 (1951) (en banc); Mooney v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 352 Mo. 245, 176 S.W.2d 605 (1944); State v. Gregory, 339
Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47 (1936); State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271
(1918); Jordan v. Robert Half Personnel Agencies, 615 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins., 234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865
(1938); Ross, Impeaching One's Own Witness in Missouri, 37 Mo. L. REv. 507 (1972).
3. Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943); State v. Granberry,
491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); Rogers v. Fiandaca, 491 S.W.2d 560 (Mo.
1973); State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865 (1938).
4. Several authorities have noted the futility of instructing a juror to dis-
regard the truth of an out-of-court statement. Assuming that a juror would compre-
hend the distinction between use of the statement for impeachment and as substantive
evidence, a juror will inevitably decide which of the two statements he believes is
true, thus giving the evidence substantive weight. See, e.g., Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337
Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (1935) (en banc); McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251 (E. Cleary
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attorneys often attempted to get the evidence before the jury under the guise
of impeachment, actually hoping that it would be considered as substantive
evidence.'
Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed these issues, forming
new evidentiary rules to govern the impeachment of one's own witness and
the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. In Rowe v.
Farmers Insurance Company,6 the Missouri Supreme Court held that in a
civil case one can impeach his own witness by use of a prior inconsistent
statement without limitation.7 In addition, prior inconsistent statements can
now be considered as substantive evidence in civil cases where the witness is
at trial and subject to cross-examination.8 Although the decision provides a
much needed change in Missouri evidentiary rules, it fails to answer some
important questions and to provide certain necessary safeguards.
In Rowe, suit was brought when an insurance company failed to pay a
claim on an automobile insurance policy. The plaintiff's automobile was
found burning in a field approximately seven miles from his home. The
insurance company asserted that the plaintiff either had his automobile burned
to collect the insurance proceeds or had later known who was responsible
but failed to report this information to the company or the police.9 At trial
the insurance company called the plaintiff's cousin as a witness. During the
investigation of the fire the witness told a police officer that he had overheard
the plaintiff tell another man that he intended to burn his car in order to
buy a truck. In a later deposition and at trial, however, the witness denied
overhearing any such conversation. The plaintiff had visited the witness just
a week prior to the pre-trial deposition and had discussed his suit against
the insurance company. 0
3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; Graham, Employing Incon-
sistent Statements for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review
and Proposed Amendment of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613, and 607,
75 MiCH. L. REv. 1565, 1573 (1977).
The court in Rowe also recognized the ineffectiveness of a limiting instruction,
stating that it was at best confusing and that, "the repetitive effect of calling attention
to the prior inconsistent statement by the instruction probably cannot do other than
highlight the matter in the minds of the jurors thereby making them more inclined
to rely on the statement than to disregard it." Rowe v. Farmers Ins. Co., 699 S.W.2d
423, 426 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
5. Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness is Still with Us: An
Analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HorsTRA L. REv.
65, 66 (1976); see also United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir.
1971).
6. 699 S.W.2d 423.
7. Id. at 425.
8. Id. at 428.
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The trial court did not allow the defendant to introduce evidence of the
witness' prior inconsistent statement, relying upon the rule against impeach-
ing one's own witness. Similarly, an extrajudicial written statement by the
plaintiff's girlfriend that she saw the plaintiff give his car to some people
the night it was burned was also excluded after she denied making the state-
ment in a deposition. Again, the trial court reasoned that one could not
impeach his own witness. The jury found the insurance company liable on
the policy and the court of appeals affirmed."
After examining the basis of the rule against impeaching one's own
witness, the Missouri Supreme Court found that valid reasons for the rule
no longer existed. The court observed that it was unrealistic to expect parties
to guarantee the credibility of their witness since they are forced to take
witnesses as they find them. 2 It also noted that the rule actually inhibited
the ability of courts and juries to determine the truth because information
reflecting on the witness' credibility was not before them. Thus, the court
followed the trend of other states,'13 deciding that, "the time has come for
us to recognize the right of any party to introduce a prior inconsistent state-
ment to impeach any witness regardless of by whom the witness may have
been subpoenaed or called.' ' 14
The court then abandoned the orthodox rule, thereby allowing use of
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence in civil cases where the
witness is at trial and subject to cross-examination.15 The court reasoned that
the earlier extrajudicial statement was often more reliable than the statement
made at trial and that instructions to jurors allowing the out-of-court state-
ment to be considered only for assessing the witness' credibility were con-
fusing. 16 Moreover, by having the witness available for present cross-
examination, any hearsay dangers were greatly diminished. 7 The case was
remanded by the court for a new trial'"
Although the exact origin of the rule against impeaching one's own
witness is uncertain, 9 it had its basis in early trial practice where witnesses
11. Id.
12. Id. at 424.
13. See infra note 32.
14. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 425.
15. Id. at 428. The court specifically limited its holding to civil cases, although
it noted that the Missouri legislature similarly abandoned the orthodox rule in criminal
cases in Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.074 (1985). Judge Donnelly, in his concurring opinion,
expressed concern that the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive
evidence in criminal cases would violate the defendant's right of confrontation as
provided by Mo. CoNsr. art. I, § 18(a). 699 S.W.2d at 480 (Donnelly, J., concurring).
Thus, in his view, the new Missouri statute would be unconstitutional. The supreme
court, however, did not address this issue in its decision.
16. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 426.
17. Id. at 427.
18. Id. at 428.
19. Three major theories have been advanced as to the origin of the rule
1987]
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were in effect character witnesses for the parties and had no knowledge of
the merits of the suit. Each party would gather friends and relatives to be
"oath-helpers" who testified as to the veracity of that party.20 Therefore, it
was inconceivable to allow a party to impeach his own witness. If a witness
did not testify as expected, then the party could only blame himself for not
having chosen a better witness.
The purpose of the rule against impeaching one's own witness was based
on several rationales. 2' First, in early practice the party was thought to vouch
for the credibility of his own witnesses.? Since the parties chose their own
witnesses, they were required to guarantee their credibility. In today's trial
setting, however, a party cannot choose his witnesses but instead must rely
on those with knowledge of the facts.? Moreover, it is often difficult to
determine who is a party's "own witness" and consequently, which party
should vouch for his credibility.2 Since it is unrealistic to expect a party to
guarantee his witness' credibility, this rationale is no longer a valid basis for
the rule.
A further justification for the rule was that if such impeachment were
allowed, the witness could be coerced into giving favorable testimony by fear
of abuse of his character by the disappointed party?25 Witnesses are often
easily intimidated by domineering attorneys. If the witness had made an out-
of-court statement which was inaccurate or misleading, he may have been
afraid to recant or correct that statement at trial. His testimony could thus
against impeaching one's own witness. The first theory is that the rule arose from
the decisory oath of Roman law which was part of the Code Justinian. Professor
Wigmore espouses the second theory that the rule had its origins in the medieval trial
by compurgation. See 3A J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TaLmis AT CoMIXoN LAW § 896
(1970). Finally, Dean Ladd advanced the theory that the more probable origin was
found in the transition from the inquisitorial method of trial to an adversary system.
See Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments; 4 U. Cm. L.
REv. 69, 70 (1936).
20. Schatz, Impeachment of One's Own Witness: Present New York Law and
Proposed Changes, 27 CORNELL L. REv. 377, 378 (1942); Comment, Impeaching One's
Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996 (1963).
21. See McCoMucK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 38; J. WIGMORE, supra
note 19, §§ 898-99; Ladd, supra note 19, at 76-82; Ross, supra note 2, at 507; Schatz,
supra note 20, at 379.
22. See State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1963); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351
Mo. 628, 647, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
4, § 38; J. WioMoRE, supra note 19, § 898; Ladd, supra note 19, at 76; Ross, supra
note 2, at 507; Comment, supra note 20, at 1005.
23. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 38; J. WIGMORE, supra note
19, § 898; Ladd, supra note 19, at 77; Ross, supra note 2, at 508; Schatz, supra note
20, at 379-80, 389.
24. For a discussion of the problem of determining who is one's own witness,
see J. WioMoRE, supra note 19, § 909; Ross, supra note .2, at 509-12;
25. J. WimioRE, supra note 19, § 899; Ladd, supra note 19, at 80; Ross,
supra note 2, at 508; Schatz, supra note 20, at 380.
[Vol. 52
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be swayed by an overpowering attorney who had the ability to either build
the witness' character or to blacken his reputation for truthfulness by intro-
ducing his prior contradictory statement. Therefore, the coercion argument
as a basis for the rule still makes some sense. However, the rule protects
both the honest and dishonest witness; and the honest witness would most
likely be able to explain any inconsistencies from his earlier testimony without
fear of abuse of his character. 2
6
A final rationale given for the rule was that if prior out-of-court state-
ments were allowed into evidence for impeachment purposes, then the state-
ments were already in front of the jury and could be considered as substantive
evidence, notwithstanding the limiting instructions. 27 Thus, to prevent this
misuse, courts reasoned that the prior inconsistent statement should not be
admitted into evidence for any purpose against one's own witness. After the
Rowe decision, however, this is not a valid justification for the rule in Mis-
souri. Moreover, in all impeachment situations involving out-of-court state-
ments, evidence which may be prejudicial to one party is nonetheless presented
to the jury and is often considered for improper purposes.
In the Rowe decision, the Missouri Supreme Court recognized the un-
reasonableness of the no impeachment rule in modern trial settings. 8 Use of
the rule to prohibit impeaching one's own witness would actually limit the
jury's ability to find out the truth since important information regarding the
witness' credibility would be kept from them.29 In addition, where the witness
had made prior inconsistent statements out-of-court, such statements could
still be used for some other purpose such as refreshing recollection. There-
26. J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 899.
27. McCoRucK ON EvmENcE, supra note 4, § 38; Ladd supra note 19, at
86; Ross, supra note 2, at 508-09.
28. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 424 ("No valid reason for this anachronistic rule
would seem to exist today").
29. In London Guar. and Accident Co. v. Woelfe, 83 F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir.
1936) the court stated:
The purpose of a trial, however, is to seek for and, if possible, find
the truth and to do justice between the parties according to the actual facts
and the law, and any rule which stands in the way of ascertaining the truth
and thus hampers the administration of justice must give way.
Id.; see also, McCORMICK ON EvmENcE, supra note 4, § 38; Schatz, supra note 20,
at 390.
30. For the purpose of refreshing a witness' memory where the witness claimed
that he had forgotten a prior observance, the attorney could "direct the attention of
[the] witness to statements previously made by him as to the subject-matter of his
testimony ... ." Brown v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 315 Mo. 409, 419, 286 S.W.
45, 50 (1926).
Cross-examination of one's own witness for the purpose of refreshing his rec-
ollection concerning an out-of-court statement is proper within reasonable limits and
is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 152, 112 S.W.2d 865, 874 (1938). Although the
5
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fore, although the statement could not have been used to impeach one's own
witness, it nevertheless may have had the effect of discrediting him. Because
of its limited utility in today's courtrooms, the rule prohibiting the impeach-
ment of one's own witness has now been abandoned by the majority of
states. 3' Most states have adopted the approach of Rule 607 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which provides that "the credibility of a witness may be
attacked by any party, including the party calling him."3 2 Other states have
placed limitations on when one may impeach his own witness, such as re-
quiring a showing of surprise and affirmative harm.33 Missouri now appears
to follow the federal rules approach.34
Prior to the Rowe decision, the rule in Missouri was that impeachment
of one's own witness was prohibited absent a showing of surprise and en-
trapment. 5 In order to impeach the witness, the party had to show actual
surprise at the witness' unfavorable testimony.36 Thus if the party knew in
advance that the witness had changed his testimony, he could not impeach
the witness as to any earlier inconsistent statements.37 In addition, the party
had to be entrapped into calling the witness and affirmatively harmed by his
evidence is not admissible to impeach the witness, it nonetheless often has that effect.
See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 38, at 84 n.12.
31. McCoRMIcK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 4, § 38; J. WIoMOpE, supra note
19, §§ 904-05 (Supp. 1985).
32. FED. R. Evm. 607; ALASKA R. Evm. 607; Amuz. R. Evm. 607; ARK. Urie.
R. Evm. 607; CAL. Evm. CODE § 785 (West 1966); COLO. R. EviD. 607 ; DEL. UNIT.
R. Evm. 607; HAw. R. Evm. 607; ILL. Sup. CT. R. 238 (criminal cases); IowA R.
Evm. 607; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-420 (1963); ME. R. EviD. 607; MINN. R. EvID.
607; MONT. R. Evm. 607(a); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-607 (1979); N.M. R. EvI. 607;
N.C. R. Evrn. 607; N.D. R. Evm. 607; OKLA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, § 2607 (West
1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 19-14-8 (1979); TEx. R. Evim. 607; UTAH R.
Evm. 20; VT. R. Evm. 607; WAsH. R. Evm. 607; Wis. R. EvI). 906.07; Wyo. R.
Evm. 607; Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982); Tri-City Van & Storage,
Inc. v. Slone, 437 S.W.2d 211 (Ky. 1969).
33. State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 82 A.2d 816 (1951); Poole v. State, 290
Md. 114, 428 A.2d 434 (1981); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 165 So. 2d 345 (1964);
People v. Knatz, 76 App. Div. 2d 889, 428 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1980); D. C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-102 (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(2) (West 1979); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 238
(1967); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-15 (Burns 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:487
(West 1967); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23 (West 1959); MICH. R. Evm.
607; N.J. R. Evm. 20; OHIo R. EvID. 607; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-403 (1984).
34. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 425.
35. See cases cited supra note 2. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Billings,
arguing in favor of the old rule, set forth the precise parameters of the common law
rule in Missouri. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 437-38 (Billings, J., dissenting).
36. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Crabtree v. Kum,
351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851 (1943); Jordan v. Robert Half Personnel Agencies,
615 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865 (1938).
37. Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851 (1943).
[Vol. 52
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testimony. 8 There must have been prejudice to the party due to his justified
reliance on the witness' earlier testimony. 9 Mere lack of memory, failure to
testify, or failure to relate favorable facts did not constitute harm sufficient
to allow impeachment. 40 The witness had to give testimony positively favor-
able to the other side so as to "become in effect a witness for the adverse
side. ' 4' In other words, harm was defined not only as actual harm to the
proponent, but also as favorable results to the opponenL If such surprise
and harm were shown, then the party would be allowed to introduce his own
witness' prior inconsistent statement for impeachment. One question which
the Missouri court did not specifically address in Rowe, and on which the
federal courts seem to be unsure, is whether the party must still show surprise
and harm in order to impeach his own witness. 42 Federal Rule 607 makes no
mention of surprise and harm, both of which had been required for im-
peachment prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules.43 Nonetheless, some
federal courts have since hinted at the continued vitality of these requirements
notwithstanding the clear language of Rule 607.44 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in particular has found surprise and harm relevant to allowing
impeachment, but has noted that it is uncertain whether those factors are
now mandatory.4
In Rowe, the defendant's attorney could not claim surprise at the wit-
ness' testimony because the statements made during the investigation had
38. State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); Crabtree, 351 Mo. 628, 173
S.W.2d 851; State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918); Jordan v. Robert
Half Personnel Agencies, 615 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
39. Crabtree, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851; Ross, supra note 2, at 517.
40. United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1971); Goings v. United
States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); State v. Byrd,
676 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Armbruster, 641 S.W.2d 763 (Mo.
1963); Crabtree, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851; Ordover, supra note 5, at 67.
41. State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State v. Armbruster,
641 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. 1963); State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918);
Ross, supra note 2, at 516.
42. One commentator states that surprise and harm are no longer required in
federal court. Ordover, supra note 5, at 68. However, some federal courts have
implied otherwise. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
43. United States v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287, 291 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Watson, 450 F.2d
290, 291 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 993 (1972); United States v. Dunmore,
446 F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1971); Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); Graham, supra note 4, at 1612; Ordover,
supra note 5, at 67.
44. See Ruff v. Wyrick, 709 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542 (5th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th
Cir. 1975); Graham, supra note 4, at 1613.
45. Ruff v. Wyrick, 709 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rogers,
549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976); Graham, supra note 4, at 1613.
7
Shell: Shell: Missouri's New Evidentiary Rules
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
already been contradicted by later statements in the witness' pre-trial depo-
sition. Thus, a showing of surprise no longer seems to be required for im-
peachment. 46 Moreover, because the witness merely failed to give desired
testimony, his statements were not harmful as defined in earlier decisions.4 7
Similarly, his testimony did not positively benefit the plaintiff since he denied
ever making the statement that he had overheard the conversation. The court
instead allowed impeachment where the witness' testimony was merely less
favorable than expected. The court's actual intent may have been to redefine
the requirement of harm. Indeed, requiring some harm as a prerequisite to
impeachment of one's own witness does seem reasonable.4 1 If, on the other
hand, harm was required as defined under the former rule, then the defendant
would be unable to impeach the witness with his prior inconsistent statement.
Since the decision purports to abolish the old Missouri rule, it is likely that
impeachment of a party's own witness will now be allowed notwithstanding
the absence of surprise or affirmative harm. 49
A major problem in the decision lies in the relevance of the inconsistent
statement. In order to justify admission of the prior inconsistent statement
for impeachment, the in-court testimony must in a real sense contradict the
earlier statement 0 It must not only be inconsistent with the witness' testi-
mony, but must also be related to a noncollateral matter." For example,
where a witness makes an out-of-court statement that "the light was red
when the plaintiff crossed the intersection," and then in-court testifies that
"the light was green," there is an inconsistency as to a noncollateral matter.
The color of the light is the inconsistency and is also relevant to the issues
at trial.
46. Even when the statement can be used only for impeachment, the require-
ment of surprise has received much criticism. Two common objections are made to
the requirement of surprise. First, even if prior to trial the party knows of the change
in testimony he should still be allowed to show the contradiction since he would have
been able to do that had the other party called the witness. The second objection lies
in that the change in testimony will generally affect only a portion of the entire
testimony. Therefore, the party should be able to benefit from the remainder of that
witness' testimony and yet show the contradiction on this one point. J. WIGMoME,
supra note 19, § 904; see also London Guar. and Accident Co. v. Woelfe, 83 F.2d
325, 334 (8th Cir. 1936); MCCORMICK oN EvmENcE, supra note 4, § 38, at 83.
47. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
48. Dean Ladd found that no legitimate purpose for impeachment existed
where harm was not present, stating that "the problem is presented only when a
witness gives destructive testimony to the party who calls him, and has previously
made favorable declarations to the contrary." Ladd, supra note 19, at 87.
49. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 425.
50. See Comment, supra note 20, at 1004.
51. U.S. v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1985); Shanahan v. Southern
Pac. Co., 188 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1951); Conley v. Kaney, 250 S.W.2d 350 (Mo.
1952); Wiesemann v. Pavlat, 413 S.W.2d 23, 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
[Vol. 52
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However, suppose the witness makes an out-of-court statement to a
police officer that "the light was red when the plaintiff crossed the inter-
section." Then in court the witness says "I did not see the light." What is
the inconsistency? It is whether or not the witness saw the light. The evidence
relevant to the issues in the law suit is whether or not the light was red.
Whether the witness saw the light or not is an extrinsic matter.
Similarly, what is the inconsistenty in the Rowe decision? The witness'
extrajudicial statement was "I overheard the plaintiff tell X that he was
going to burn his car to get the insurance." On the stand at trial the witness
testified "I did not ever make that statement. ' 52 Here the inconsistency lies
in whether the witness made the statement or not. This is a collateral matter
since it has no independent purpose other than for contradiction.53 Therefore,
the prior inconsistent statement should not have been admissible. The re-
suiting confusion and delays should not justify admission of the statement
where it deals with a collateral matter and where no harm is shown.
If harm was required as a prerequisite to impeachment, then there is
some assurance as to the relevancy of the out-of-court statement; in order
for harm to occur, the statement must deal with a matter in issue. Moreover,
if the earlier statement is admitted only because of its affect on the credibility
of the witness, then a party would have no legitimate reason for proving his
own witness' prior inconsistent statement unless he has been harmed. Whether
or not harm is still required to impeach one's own witness in Missouri is left
unanswered by the Rowe decision.
When determining whether a prior inconsistent statement should be ad-
mitted as substantive evidence, the main concern is whether the statement is
sufficiently complete and accurate for presentation to the jury. 4 Missouri
previously followed the orthodox rule that extrajudicial prior inconsistent
statements were hearsay and therefore could not be admitted as the truth of
the matter asserted. 55 The prior inconsistent statement, however, would be
used to impeach the credibility of a witness.5 6 Use of the statement to impeach
52. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 423.
53. U.S. v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1985); Kirkendoll v. Neustrom,
379 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1967); Conley v. Kaney, 250 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1952).
54. Ordover, supra note 5, at 69.
55. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); State v. Kinne,
372 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins., 234 Mo. App.
135, 112 S.W.2d 865 (1938).
56. See cases cited supra note 55. The prior inconsistent statement could be
used to impeach a witness, whether made in or out of court. Neavill v. Klemp, 427
S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo. 1968). The prior inconsistent statement may be used to impeach
because its existence affects the credibility of the witness. The statement is relevant
because when taken with his contradictory in court testimony, the jury may infer
that the witness has erred. Either he has some reason to lie, some bias, faulty memory
or perception, or faulty recollection, or he has some other quality which has caused
him to change his testimony. This capacity to err thereby affects his credibility as a
witness. J. WiGMoRE, supra note 19, §§ 902, 1017.
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but not as substantive evidence was problematic because confusing instruc-
tions made it difficult for juries to disregard prior statements except for
impeachment purposes. 7 Attorneys would introduce the prior inconsistent
statement in front of the jury under the guise of impeachment, actually
hoping that the jurors would consider the truthfulness of the statement. If
a juror believed the witness had told the truth earlier, then it was difficult
for the juror to ignore the truth of that prior statement.5 8 Consequently, the
rules on impeaching a witness by a prior inconsistent statement and on the
admission of the statement as substantive evidence should mirror each other.
If the statement is admissible to impeach, it should be admissible as sub-
stantive evidence.5 9
In Rowe, the Missouri Supreme Court abandoned the orthodox rule
finding that "when the declarant is available for cross-examination.. . enough
of the dangers of hearsay and unreliability [are] absent to justify the sub-
stantive use of prior inconsistent statements in civil cases."' 6 In determining
the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement, there must be sufficient
assurance that the statement was in fact made.6' As an out-of-court statement
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the statement falls within the
definition of hearsay. 62 This was the basis of the orthodox rule. 63 As hearsay,
the extrajudicial statement has the inherent problems of no opportunity to
cross-examine at the time the statement was made, inability of the jury to
observe the demeanor of the witness, and the fact that the statement was
not made under oath. 4 The main concern actually lies in the lack of a right
to immediate cross-examination. 65
The issue is whether later cross-examination at trial is a sufficient sub-
stitute for contemporaneous cross-examination at the time the statement was
57. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528, 535 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); Mc-
ColuICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 251.
58. Graham, supra note 4, at 1573.
59. See Graham, supra note 4; Ordover, supra note 5.
60. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 428.
61. Not only must there be sufficient assurance that the prior statement was
made but there also must be assurance that "subtle influence, coercion, or deception
has not impaired its reliability." Graham, supra note 4, at 1582.
62. See J. WiGMO E, supra note 19, § 1018; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 H.Av. L. REv. 177 (1948).
63. Cantwell & McGlamery, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Conflict Between
State and Federal Rules of Evidence, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1495, 1497 (1983); see also
DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 366 (2d Cir. 1925) (court found that hearsay
objection to prior inconsistent statement was not in substance good since the witness
was in court and available for cross-examination).
64. DiCarlo, 6 F.2d at 368; Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins., 234 Mo.
App. 135, 151, 112 S.W.2d 865, 874; McCoRMICK ON EVmENCE, supra note 4, § 251;
Cantwell & McGlamery, supra note 63, at 1497; Graham, supra note 4, at 1568.
65. See Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 124-25, 129, 150 N.W.2d 146, 155-
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made. Several authorities have argued that stale cross-examination cannot be
an effective substitute to prevent hearsay dangers." Most legal scholars,
however, have viewed the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial
as an adequate safeguard. 6
7
Another justification for the orthodox rule is that an essential element
of the law suit should not be proven by an unacknowledged out-of-court
statement.69 However, as Judge Blackmar notes in his concurring opinion,
every element of the case must be established by substantial evidence. There-
fore, a court will be reluctant to accept a single out-of-court statement to
establish an essential element of the case. 69
In his Rowe dissenting opinion, Judge Billings also pointed out dangers
which would exist if oral, extrajudicial, prior inconsistent statements were
admissible as substantive evidence.7 0 Because the concern is for the accuracy
of the out-of-court statement, any influences which may affect the truthful-
ness of the statement must be considered. The risk of complete fabrication,
inaccurate or incomplete presentation of the earlier statement, and the pos-
sibility of undue influence in getting the statement are all dangers which are
present. 71 Many months or possibly years have passed between the time of
66. One court noted the difficulty with stale cross-examination. It reasoned
that since cross-examination is an adversary proceeding, the cross-examiner is at-
tempting to have the witness equivocate his testimony. Where the witness refuses to
adopt his prior statement, there can be no effective cross-examination regarding it.
Additionally, the court noted that the prior inconsistent statement is given a stronger
status over in court testimony, and that the adverse cross-examiner must in effect
become the witness' friend in order to rehabilitate his in court statements. Ruhala,
379 Mich. at 124-25, 150 N.W.2d at 156.
Finally, the court stated:
No matter how deadly the thrust of the cross-examiner, the ghost of
the prior statement still stands. His questions will always sound like attempts
to permit the witness to explain why he changed his story before coming to
court, with the jury being left to infer that he might have been induced to
change his story in the intervening months or years for some unrevealed and
sinister reason.
Id. at 128, 150 N.W.2d at 158; see also State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528, 533
(Mo. 1973) (en banc).
67. Both McCormick and Wigmore adhere to the view that the purpose of
the hearsay rule is satisfied where the witness is available for present cross-examination
since there is ample opportunity to ask him about his prior statement. McComscIK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 251, at 245; J. WiGMoRE, supra note 19, § 1018, at
996; see also Cantwell & McGlamery, supra note 63, at 1498.
68. This concern is most often expressed in criminal cases where, for example,
the witness has made an out-of-court inconsistent statement identifying the defendant
as the guilty party. When the witness recants his identification at trial, the out-of-
court statement should not then be allowed as the sole evidence of the defendant's
guilt. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945).
69. Rowe, 699 S.W.2d at 429.
70. Id., at 434-35.
71. Id. at 434.
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the original statement and the trial. The witness could have lied at the time
the statement was made. Similarly, the statement could be given an unin-
tended meaning or be incomplete. It also may have been the result of sug-
gestion or coercion. At the time of trial the witness most likely could not
repeat exact statements he had made months before. Thus, the possibility of
inaccuracy is much greater where there has been no contemporaneous record
made of the oral extrajudicial statement.
Notwithstanding these concerns, the trend has been towards abandon-
ment of the orthodox rule. Because some extrajudicial statements have suf-
ficient guarantees as to their reliability, many courts have allowed their
admission into evidence. 72 Indeed, some prior extrajudicial statements may
be even more reliable than the in court testimony. Since the prior statement
is made closer in time to the disputed event, the witness' memory is clearer
and there has been less time for other influences to alter the witness' view.73
There are also guarantees as to reliability where the prior inconsistent state-
ment has been accurately recorded in some form, such as a written statement
signed by the declarant, or a videotaped or taperecorded statement.
Prior deposition testimony had been deemed nonhearsay by the Missouri
Supreme Court so that such testimony could be admitted as substantive
evidence even though it involved out-of-court prior inconsistent statements. 74
Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted in 1972 provide that prior
inconsistent statements which are in testimonial form may be considered as
substantive evidence in federal courts.75 Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides that a
statement is not hearsay and therefore may be admitted as substantive evi-
dence if "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent with
his testimony, and was ... given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition.2 76
The new Missouri rule announced in the Rowe decision conforms with
an earlier proposed Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 77 The proposed rule would
have provided that any prior inconsistent statement is nonhearsay and may
be considered as substantive evidence if the witness is present at trial and
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. After much debate,
72. Cantwell & McGlamery, supra note 63, at 1498; Morgan, supra note 62,
at 193.
73. Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 318, 85 S.W.2d 400, 411 (1935) (en
banc); McCoMLCK ON EviDENCE, supra note 4, § 251, at 745; Cantwell & McGlamery,
supra note 63, at 1500.
74. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1973) (en banc); Pulitzer, 337
Mo. at 320, 85 S.W.2d at 411.
75. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(A).
76. Id.
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however, Congress limited the admissibility of such statements to those which
were more reliable, i.e., those which were originally made under oath and
subject to cross-examination. 78
In its complete abandonment of the orthodox rule, Missouri has joined
the majority of other states. Many states have adopted the approach of the
proposed federal rule instead of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as adopted.7 9 The re-
mainder of the states are divided between those that still adhere to the or-
thodox rule 0 and those that follow rules similar to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.8 Although one of the results anticipated by Con-
78. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(A). The federal rule as adopted was different
from the proposed rule because of fear of potential abuses. McCoRIICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 4, § 251, at 746. Several fears were expressed including:
The dariger that pressure would be increased to secure more pre-trial
statements, that untrue statements would be obtained for use at trial by
oppressive insurance adjusters, that trials would be cluttered by prior state-
ments and that trials would proceed by the use of carefully written statements
drafted in the lawyer's offices.
Ordover, supra note 5, at 74; For a discussion of the legislative history of Rule
801(d)(1)(A), see Cantwell & McGlamery, supra note 63, at 1503-05; Graham, supra
note 4, at 1575-81.
79. Alaska: Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1971), ALSmKA R. Evmn.
801(d)(1)(A); Arizona: Amz. R. Evm. 801(d)(1), State v. Skinner, 110 Ariz. 135, 515
P.2d 880 (1973); Arkansas: ARK. UNip. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(i) (civil); California: CAL.
Evm. CODE § 1235" (West 1966); Colorado: CoLO. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A), People v.
Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 568 P.2d 449 (1977); Delaware: DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3507(a) (1979) (criminal), Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18 (Del. 1975); Georgia: Gibbons
v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982); Indiana: Patterson v. State, 263 Ind.
55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(a) (1976), State v.
Holt, 228 Kan. 16, 612 P.2d 570 (1980); Kentucky: Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639
S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1982); Montana: MONT. R. Evm. 801(d)(1); Nevada: NEv. REv.
STAT. § 51.035(2)(a) (1971); New Jersey: N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A.84A (Supp. 1974);
N.J. R. Evm. 63(1)(a); North Dakota: N.D. R. Evw. 801(d)(1)(A) (civil); Pennsyl-
vania: Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa. Super. 398, 399 A.2d 1110 (1979); South
Carolina: State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert denied, 460
U.S. 1103 (1983); Utah: UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Wisconsin: Wis. R. EvID.
908.01(4)(a)(1); Wyoming: Wyo. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (civil).
80. Isbell v. State, 57 Ala. App. 444, 329 So. 2d 133, cert. denied, 295 Ala.
407, 329 So. 2d 140 (1976); Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542 (D.C. 1982);
People v. Krug, 38 Ill. App. 3d 383, 347 N.E.2d 807 (1976); State v. Ray, 259 La.
105, 249 So. 2d 540 (1971); Capital Raceway v. Smith, 22 Md. App. 224, 322 A. 2d
238 (1974); Sims v. State, 313 So. 2d 388 (Miss. 1975); State v. Gomes, 116 N.H.
113, 352 A.2d 713 (1976); State v. Sinclair, 45 N.C. App. 586, 263 S.E.2d 811, rev'd
on other grounds, 301 N.C. 193, 270 S.E.2d 418 (1980); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d
23 (R.I. 1979); Martin v. State, 584 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(1) (West 1979); HAw. R. Evrm. 802.1(1);
ME. R. Evm. 801(d)(1); MIcH. R. EviD. 801(d)(1); MINN. R. Evm. 801(d)(1); NEB.
Rnv. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a) (1979); Omo R. Evm. 801(d)(1); OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2801(4)(a) (West 1980); OR. R. Evm. 801(4)(a)(A); S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN.
§ 19-16-2 (1979); TEx. R. Evm. 801(c)(1); VT. R. EvID. 801(d)(1); WASH. R. EVID.
801(d)(1); State v. Spadafore, 159 W. Va. 236, 220 S.E.2d 655 (1975).
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gress in adopting the federal rule was to provide a uniform evidentiary rule
on the use of prior inconsistent statements,8 2 the actual effect has been to
allow for more diversity between the federal and state rules.A3
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as adopted has been criticized as being too narrow in
its admission of prior inconsistent statements. 4 Certain extrajudicial state-
ments not covered in Rule 801, however, should nonetheless be admitted as
substantive evidence because there are sufficient guarantees of their reliabil-
ity. 5 For example, where the witness admits making the earlier statemefit
there is less of a problem with fabrication or distortion and the earlier state-
ments should be admissible as substantive evidence.8 6 Similarly, where the
out-of-court statement was accurately recorded it should be admissible.
The main difficulty with the Rowe decision lies in a complex fact situ-
ation to which the rules adopted are not easily applied. The out-of-court
statement should not be admissible for any purpose since it deals with a
noncollateral matter.17 Here the inconsistency is making the statement versus
not making the statement, which is not relevant to substantive evidence. What
is relevant is the truth of the statement overheard by the witness, as to which
there is no inconsistency. As previously discussed, the statement should have
been inadmissible for impeachment of the witness.8" If it is inadmissible to
impeach, it should also be inadmissible as substantive evidence.
The decision seems to reflect a desire by the court to change Missouri
evidentiary rules. However, the new rules are not easily applicable to this
case. The court could have decided that the out-of-court events were admis-
sible over hearsay objections as admissions through conduct by the plaintiff. 9
Since the plaintiff visited the witness prior to the deposition and trial and
thereafter the witness' testimony changed, the evidence could have been ad-
mitted to show the plaintiff's awareness of liability ° Many Missouri deci-
82. One of the main concerns was the problem of forum shopping due to the
different evidentiary rules followed in state and federal courts. See Weinberg, Choice
of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New Perspectives, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 594 (1974). Because most states have not followed the federal rule, the danger
of forum shopping still exists.
83. See Cantwell & McGlamery, supra note 63, at 1512-17.
84. See McCoRMCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 38, at 121; Graham, supra
note 4, at 1566, 1582.
85. See Graham, supra note 4, at 1566; supra notes 72-74 and accompanying
text.
86. See Graham, supra note 4, at 1583.
87. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
88. Id.
89. Admission by conduct is generally regarded as any wrongdoing by a party
in connection with his case which amounts to an obstruction of justice. United States
v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1978); see also Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86
(1882); McConlncK ON EvIDENCE, supra note 4, § 273, at 808.
90. United States v. Bongard, 713 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983); State v. Stapleton,
14
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sions have allowed evidence to show that a party has attempted to fabricate
or destroy evidence or to persuade a potential witness. 9' The court instead
decided to abandon the orthodox rule as to prior out-of-court statements.
Changes in Missouri evidentiary rules regarding the use of prior incon-
sistent statements for impeachment of one's own witness and as substantive
evidence were needed notwithstanding the difficult application to the Rowe
decision. Prior to Rowe, Missouri followed outdated rules of law which no
longer conformed to the realities of today's courtrooms. In allowing im-
peachment of one's own witness, the Missouri Supreme Court has provided
a more effective mechanism for finding the truth where the witness has made
inconsistent statements. Moreover, by the admission of a prior inconsistent
statement as substantive evidence, jury confusion and attorney manipulation
has been diminished in civil cases.
Nonetheless, the new rules go too far and some limitations should be
imposed. Impeachment of one's own witness should still require some show-
ing of harm. Without such a requirement there would be useless delays while
the jury was subjected to the admission of collateral evidence irrelevant to
the law suit. In addition, by allowing for admission of all prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence where the declarant is at trial and subject
to cross-examination, the court has failed to provide necessary safeguards to
assure that the statement was in fact made. In contrast, the Federal Rules
provide an approach which is too limited in that many reliable statements
would be excluded. A better approach is to allow for admission of out-of-
court prior inconsistent statements which are made under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition,
as under the Federal Rules. In addition, statements which are acknowledged
by the declarant or which have been accurately recorded, either by written
statement signed by the declarant or by videotape or taperecording should
be admissible. By providing such limitations there is sufficient assurance that
the statement was in fact made and the basis of the hearsay rule is preserved.
KMERLY A. SHELL
518 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); State v. Seals, 515 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1974);
State v. Mason, 394 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1965); State v. Smith, 355 Mo. 59, 194 S.W.2d
905 (1946); State v. Matthews, 202 Mo. 143, 100 S.W. 420 (1907); State v. Chunn,
701 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Holman, 556 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977).
91. See cases cited supra note 90.
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